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Abstract
This paper analyzes the data of a survey sampling performed in the French island
La RØunion, on behalf of the Regional Directorate for the Environment (DIREN), in
order to explain the average water over-consumption of the island inhabitants with
respect to that of metropolitan France.We divide our data set into two sub-groups
with di⁄erent income level. Finally, we ￿nd that only low income familly can reduce
their water consumption by increasing intramarginal prices through an income e⁄ect.
Very preliminary draft
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the data of a survey sampling performed in the French island La
RØunion, on behalf of the Regional Directorate for the Environment (DIREN). We try to
explain the average water over-consumption of the island inhabitants with respect to that
of metropolitan France by estimating the water demand function.
In La Reunion, water consumption level, computed with municipal aggregate data,
seems to be excessive: with 250 liter by day per inhabitant in this tropical island against
an average level of 150l in France. Furthermore, in this French overseas ￿ dØpartement￿ ,
water has become the source of increasing controversy, as supplies fail to meet demand in
many areas, especially in the west part of the island. Therefore, an household survey is
necessary to analyze the water consumption of households.
1This paper is an original contribution to the literature on residential water demand
estimation. Firstly it is based on a detailed survey data. In the literature, estimation of
residential water demand at the micro level are rather few, see for example HankØ and
de MarØ (1982), Jones and Morris (1984), Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989), Schneider
and Whitlatch (1991), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), and Maresca et al (1997) in France.
Secondly, we focus on the part played by the pricing of water services structure to control
demand. Our speci￿cation explicitly incorporates the complexity of water pricing. We
show that pricing structure plays a crucial part, but indirectly via an income e⁄ect.
The following two sections deals with those questions. The next section explains the
data setup, after which the results of estimating two water demand functions using a
sample of 173 families from all the 24 localities in La Reunion taken in 2004 are presented
and discussed. Some conclusions are drawn in a ￿nal section.
2 The household survey in La Reunion
We retain a strati￿ed sampling of 2000 households according to municipalities, i.e. 1% of
the total household population
The questionnaire includes 25 questions concerning:
￿ Socio economic characteristics (sex, householder age and occupation, family income
and size, number of working people and child, and if they are tenants or property
owners)
￿ Housing characteristics (individual family house or apartment, age, number of rooms
and altitude)
￿ Water consumption equipment (swimming pool, washing machine, dishwasher, gar-
den or vegetable garden ownership).
￿ Consumption habits (washing frequency, business activity at home)
￿ Questions to collect the six last water bills, over one year, later by post..
2Finally, we collected useful water bills from 173 households. But billing period are
di⁄erent (various months between 1998 and 2002) and only from 1 to 3 water bills per
household recording actual water consumption.
Corresponding daily weather indicators as precipitation, temperature and evapotran-
spiration are taken from ￿ MØtØo France￿services. Unfortunately, evapotranspiration data
are incomplete.
3 Microeconometric speci￿cation of daily household water
consumption
Two simple regression models are compared in order to study the strength of empirical
results. The ￿rst one is linear, and the alternative one is a loglog approximation of the
￿rst one with ln(1 ￿ D
I￿F ) = ￿ D
I￿F :
qd
i = c + ￿r(Ii ￿ Fi) + ￿dDi + ￿ppi + ￿wWi + ￿Xi + ￿i
lnqd
i = c + ￿i ln(Ii ￿ Fi) + ￿d
Di
Ii ￿ Fi
+ ￿p lnpi + ￿ lnXi + ￿i
qd
i measures daily consumption per inhabitant, p is the marginal price.
The pricing of water is a mixture of ￿xed and variable elements. The ￿xed part is
measured by F:The tari⁄consists of di⁄erent consumption blocks with increasing marginal
prices denoted pi with each successive block. Therefore, two of the usual questions with
multipart rate schedules are how to take into account the e⁄ect of changes in intramarginal
rates, and whether marginal or average prices should be used to estimate the demand
function. The solution for the ￿rst problem has been solved by Taylor (1975), then Nordin
(1976). Otherwise, in accordance with the standard demand theory, a perfectly informed
utility maximizing consumer should react to marginal price.
When a consumer belongs to the second consumption block, the corresponding budget
constraint can be written:
Ii > FP + p1k1 + p2(qi ￿ k1) + pq:
3with Ii, the income level of individual household i, p1and p2 respectively the ￿rst and
the second block price. k1is the highest consumption level in block 1, p and q are respec-
tively an index price and the corresponding consumption level for other private goods.
Finally, the appropriate income measure is I0 = I ￿FP +(p2 ￿p1)k1:Water consumption
locally depends on the price of the marginal block (here p2), and other variables (here
FP;k1) are likely to in￿ uence resident water consumption via an income e⁄ect. Formally,
the household resident behaves as if he pays all the water consumption at price p2, then
we repay him the excess amount of money paid that is to say (p2 ￿p1)k1. (p2 ￿p1)k1 can
be considered as a virtual repayment.
In absolute value, the last term corresponds to the di⁄erence variable called D proposed
by Nordin (1976) which is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the total bill and what the
user would have paid if all units were charged at the marginal price. More precisely,
D = ￿(p2 ￿ p1)k1=(p1 ￿ p2)k1.
In La Reunion, the number of blocks depends on the municipality. It can vary from 2
to 4 blocks:
￿ When the consumer belongs to block 1, D = 0:
￿ When the consumer belongs to block 2, D = (p1 ￿ p2)k1
￿ When the consumer belongs to block 3, D = (p1 ￿ p3)k1 + (p2 ￿ p3)k2
￿ When the consumer belongs to block 4, D = (p1 ￿ p4)k1 + (p2 ￿ p4)k2 + (p3 ￿ p4)k3
Therefore, in each municipality, total e⁄ect of changes in the intramarginal prices
via this income e⁄ect can be analyzed. When p1 raises, it is af if the virtual repayment
decreases, and then, water consumption also decreases in every case. When p2 raises, the
repayment increases in block 2 and decreases in blocks 3 and 4. Therefore, total water
consumption is indeterminate:On the contrary, if we only increase the price of the last
municipal block, for instance p4;total consumption always increases.
In our study, the income measure is total family money income relate to family size
using the Oxford scale, in order to compute an income per consumption unit. Even if
household size should positively in￿ uence water consumption, the presence of economies
4of scale in the use of water weakens this e⁄ect. So, we decide to use an income proxy. To
obtain it, we divide total available income I ￿F by 1 for the ￿rst adult, plus 0,7 for other
adult, plus 0,5 for each child:
Wi denotes the weather variable. In the literature, climatic e⁄ects have been modelized
in di⁄erent ways, using precipitation measure, temperature or even evapotranspiration.
As Martie nez-Espie neiras (2002), the annual number of rainy days is preferred here to the
amount of rain to explain outside water uses. Furthermore, to avoid the colinarity problem,
a global indicator which multiply the annual number of dry days by the temperature
over the consumption period seems to be the relevant measure in estimating the demand
function..
X includes the following exogenous variables in￿ uencing household water consumption
Preliminary estimations have shown that demand is more responsive to age, number of
working people, the presence or not of a garden. Other variables, in particular those
measuring frequency of billings, housing characteristics or consumption habits, are in-
signi￿cant, probably owing to their imperfect measure. But as usual, variables as the
stock of appliances especially help to analyze long run reactions to a shock price. But that
question reaches beyond the scope of this article.
4 Econometric techniques and results
The simultaneity problem occurs when there is correlation between the error term and
any of the explanatory variables or an error in measuring any of those variables. When
this condition is not met, an econometric model is estimated using an instrumental vari-
able estimator because OLS estimates are unbiased and inconsistent. In our study, the
simultaneity problem is, at least, twofold relevant:
￿ With multipart block rates, prices are endogenously determinate by the consumer
along with quantity demanded.
￿ Traditionally, individuals do not reveal their real income.
5Usual tests have been implemented, ￿rst to check that instrument variables are strongly
correlated with the marginal price, second to be sure that instrumental variables are
uncorrelated with the error term. But we were foiled in our attempt to instrument income,
due to the lack of good instruments in our data set. Furthermore, marginal prices for 100
m3;300m3; and 500m3are chosen to instrument the marginal price.
Another problem in estimation is related to possible heterogeneity of consumer be-
haviors as regards water consumption. Chow tests clearly prove that water consumption
behaviors are sensitive to income level. An iterative procedure ￿nally leads to consider
two di⁄erent groups, the richer ones whose income per consumption unit is less than 900
euros, and the poorest whose income is greater than 899 euros.
The following tables give econometric results obtained with the two di⁄erent speci￿ca-
tions, ￿rst considering all individuals, second distinguishing the poorest from the richest
families:
Table 1: Regression results for the linear model
regressors total I<900 I>899
constant 0.02 -0,13 0,39
(0,15) (-1,23) (1,18)
I ￿ F 0,17.10￿4 0,21.10￿3 ￿ ￿ -0,61.10￿4
(0,71) (2,24) (-1,32)
p -0,08 -0,07 -0,02
(-1,08) (-1,20) (-0,16)
W 0,21.10￿4￿ 0,25.10￿4 ￿ ￿￿ 0,31.10￿4
(1,63) (2,72) (1,29)
D -0,28.10￿2 ￿ ￿￿ -0,12.10￿2 ￿ ￿ -0,36.10￿2 ￿ ￿￿
(-4,86) (-2,25) (-4,02)
age 0,34.10￿2￿ 0,19.10￿2 0,74.10￿3
(1,72) (1,46) (0,17)
work -0,069 -0,01 -0,18***
(-2,43) (-0,56) (-3,08)
garden 0,11** 0,11*** 0,18*
(2,04) (2,80) (1,71)
R2 0,32 0,29 0,43
numb:obs 154 80 74
het stat
Student stat ￿ 1,78 ￿
Table 2: Regression results for the log log model
6regressors total I<900 I>899
constant -7,90*** -9,53*** -5,46***
(-5,46) (-4,30) (-2,49)
ln (I ￿ F) 0,25*** 0,44*** 0;11
(3,91) (2,75) (0,73)
ln p -0,09 -0,17 -0,04
(-0,56) (-0,84) (-0,17)
ln W 0,31** 0,38* 0,28
(2,26) (1,90) (1,47)
D
I￿F -2;85 ￿ ￿￿ -2,32** -13;34 ￿ ￿￿
(-2,92) (-2,35) (-3,51)
ln age 0;42 ￿ ￿￿ 0,39* 0,17
(2,19) (1,70) (0,49)
ln work -0,32*** -0,09 -0,68***
(-2,86) (-0,68) (-3,73)
garden 0,42*** 0,44*** 0,44**
(3,54) (2,94) (2,39)
R2 0,3 0,28 0,47
numb:obs 154 80 74
het stat ￿ ￿
Student stat 2,67*** 1,91
* (respectively **, ***) means a signi￿cant level at the 10% (respectively 5%, 1%).
The White statistic is computed to check homoscedasticity.
Elasticity values show that the choice of speci￿cation does not greatly a⁄ect the results.
As in most studies, water demand is rather inelastic as the marginal price p is never
signi￿cant. Several explanations can explain this results:
￿ Lack of consumer information about the marginal price.
￿ Except for dietary need, with mineral water, water has no substitutes for most uses.
However, if we consider low income households, prices can play a crucial role to bring
down total water consumption, indirectly via an income e⁄ect, by reducing intramarginal
prices. It follows that coe¢ cients of income ￿i and the intramarginal premium ￿d must
be signi￿cant. Furthermore, if the econometric model is well-speci￿ed, the two coe¢ cients
should roughly be the same in absolute value but with opposite sign. This theoretical ex-
pectation have been tested successfully here, unlike most previous empirical applications,
7ArbuŁs and all (2003), Bachrach and Vaughan (1994). The corresponding Student statis-
tic, appearing in the last column of results tables, is often lower than the corresponding
critical value at the 5% level. But, this price policy will never a⁄ect well-o⁄ households
water consumption. However, note that with the log log speci￿cation, this condition is not
ful￿lled. But income heterogeneity probably weakens this result.
Results show that more working people would mean less water use. In other words, it
seems that, spending more time at home could increase water uses. This result is important
to explain the huge consumption level observed in La RØunion, where there are 30% of
unemployed people who probably spend much time at home, especially in there garden.
In this way, this result can be combined with the signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of the presence
of a garden.
In our study, unlike most studies in the literature, age exerts a positive in￿ uence
on water consumption. This result appear only with the log log speci￿cation and concern
households with an low income level. Therefore, it seems to be a rather small e⁄ect, speci￿c
to this overseas ￿ dØpartement￿ . This conclusion is con￿rmed by the typology realized.
Maybe, this result appears because retired people tend to spend much time at home and
do more gardening.
In every case, the presence of a garden positively in￿ uences water consumption, which
re￿ ects that outdoor usage is preponderant to explain water use.
We observe di⁄erences in estimated: coe¢ cients according to income level: weather,
income and the number of working people do not in￿ uence water habits for the richer
families. Their consumption cannot be cut down easily They probably water their garden
whatever the weather. Furthermore, their water consumption is independent of price and
income variations.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the data of a survey sampling performed in the French island La
RØunion, on behalf of the Regional Directorate for the Environment (DIREN), in order to
explain the average water over-consumption of the island inhabitants with respect to that
8of metropolitan France.We divide our data set into two sub-groups with di⁄erent income
level. Finally, we found that income, the tari⁄ structure with the Nordin indicator, the
weather index, and households characteristics as age, the number of working people, as
the presence of a garden are the main determinants of low income residential consumption
in La RØunion island. In other words, we show that pricing structure plays a crucial part
to control water demand, but indirectly via an income e⁄ect. Formally, the household
resident behaves as if he pays all the water consumption at the marginal price, then we
repay him the excess amount of money paid that is to say which can be considered as
a virtual repayment. More precisely, increasing the price of the ￿rst consumption block
will always reduce total water consumption. Furthermore, increasing the price of the last
municipal block, will always increase total consumption. When other marginal price is
increased, the e⁄ect on total water consumption is indeterminate:
In every case, the presence of a garden positively in￿ uences water consumption, which
re￿ ects that outdoor usage is preponderant to explain water use. Information campaign,
devoted to watch water use for gardening seems to be the second policy to conduct.
One line of future research would deal with the water demand functional form. A more
￿ exible functional form based on a Stone-Geary utility function, which accounts for a
minimum water consumption level, a subsistence level, could be used.
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